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Two  fundamental  issues  have  been  ignored  in  the  convergence  debate  which  are 
addressed  in  this  paper.  First,  there  has  been  little  attention  paid  to  the  development  of  a 
general  model  able  to explain  convergence  a  divergence.  Second,  in the rush  to put data to a 
convergence  hypothesis,  researchers  have  failed  to consider  certain  methodological  procedures 
with  respect  to  the  treatment  of  capital.  To  remedy  this  problem  we  use  an  input-output 
approach  to  measure  catch-up.  To  address  the  theoretical  lacunae  we present  case  studies  of 
Portugal  and Japan,  two countries  which by  1959 had attained  the threshold  level of development 
required  to  join  the  “convergence-  club”,  but  which,  for  various  historical  (path-dependent) 
reasons,  have  diverged  rapidly  from  each other  in the period  since  the late  1950’s. 
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1.  Introduction 
The  debate  over  the  question  of  whether  national  productivity  levels  have  converged  over  time 
has yielded  an array of ambiguous,  if not conflicting,  results.  Most studies which  include only  the  OECD 
countries  show that the dispersion  of productivity  levels across countries  has diminished  over the past  100 
years,  with  some  considerable  slowing,  if not  reversal,  in the  period  since  1973.  Those  studies  which 
include  a broader  sample  of countries  provide  much  less evidence  of convergence.  Many of these  studies 
actually  reveal  a divergence  between  the level of productivity  of the richest  and the poorest  nations  over 
time. 
While  the  convergence  debate  has  been  extremely  lively,  two  fundamental  issues  have  been 
ignored  and will be addressed  in this paper.  First,  there  has been little attention  paid to the development 
of  a general  model  of  cross-country  growth  patterns  able to  account  for  the  possibility  of  convergence 
or divergence.  Second,  in the rush to put data to the loosely-defined  convergence  hypothesis,  researchers 
have  exhibited  a failure  to  consider  certain  well-established  methodological  procedures,  especially  with 
respect  to the  operationalization  of the  concept  of  capital.  To  remedy  the  methodological  problem  we 
propose  the use of an input-output  approach  to the measurement  of catch-up.  To  address  the theoretical 
lacunae  in the  convergence  literature  we focus  on Portugal  and Japan,  two  countries  which  by  1959 had 
attained  the  threshold  level  of  development  required  to  join  the  “convergence  club”,  but  which,  for 
various  political,  cultural  and historical  (path-dependent)  reasons,  have diverged  rapidly  from  each other 
in the  period  since  the  late  1950’s.  This  case  study  stresses  the  historical  evolution  of  institutions  and 
policies  and  emphasizes  cumulative  causation,  learning  by  doing,  trade  openness  and  an  activist  trade 
policy  in explaining  why  some  countries  are able to  converge  to the  level  of productivity  of the  leading 
country  and  some  countries  diverge  from  that  level  in  spite  of  equally  concerted  efforts.  Our methodological  and  theoretical  reconsiderations 
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degree  of  international  productivity  convergence  and  thus  to  rethink  the  theoretical  foundations  of  the 
widely-accepted  convergence  theories.  The  extreme  differences  in rates of convergence  evidenced  by the 
input-output  study  indicates  the need to look closer  at the historical  and institutional  contingencies  behind 
the  radically  different  performance  of  countries  who  at a particular  moment  had  found  themselves  at a 
similar  point  on  the  catch-up  trail.  Before  turning  to the  input-output  analysis  and historical  study,  we 
briefly  review  the  theories  of convergence  that have  dominated  the  recent  flurry  of research. 
2.  Theory 
Abramowitz’s  (1986)  impressive  paper  indicates  that  for  all  the  massive  amounts  of  research 
aimed  at measuring  the  degree  of convergence  among  various  groups  of countries,  there  is surprisingly 
little  work  developing  a  theory  of  such  a  phenomenon.  The  original  rationale  for  the  concept  of 
convergence  was Gershenlcron’s  (1952) study of Russian  industrialization,  which stressed  “the advantages 
of  relative  backwardness.”  The  idea  is  that  for  a  nation  with  certain  institutions  developed  to  an 
(unspecified)  threshold  level,  imitation  is easier  than  innovation  and  “backward”  countries  should  enjoy 
a more  rapid  growth  rate  than  advanced  countries,  A  convergence  of  the  standard  of  living  of  these 
countries  should  result.  The  convergence  hypothesis  has  enormous  intuitive  appeal  but  has  been  of 
relatively  little  interest  to  traditional  neoclassical  economists  since  it  lacks  a basis  in  rational  choice, 
microeconomic  theory.’ 
The  motivation  for the recent  flurry  of research  on the question  of the international  convergence 
of productivity  perhaps  explains  the  lack of development  of a comprehensive  theoretical  accounting  for 
the  phenomenon.  The  apparent  decline  of the  U.S.  in the  world  economy  in the  mid-1980’s  led  many 
to seek  an explanation  in the  long-term  convergence  of productivity  levels  across  countries.  The  U.S. 3 
economic  decline  could  then  be  located  in  the  inevitable  catch-up  by  rivals,  and  not  in  any  inherent 
American  incompetence,  laziness  or  cultural  decay.’  Instead  of  developing  theoretical  models, 
economists  have  undertaken  econometric  studies,  all premised  on an acceptance  of the crude  form  of the 
Gershenkron  hypothesis.  Thus  the  theoretical  development  of  the  Gershenkron  hypothesis  has  been 
somewhat  ud  hoc.  But  amidst  the  spate  of  recent  studies,  three  distinct  theories  of  convergence  have 
emerged. 
The  first  two  have  been  termed  by  Baumol  (1992) as the  “common  forces”  explanation  and the 
“contagion”  model.  According  to the  common  forces  theory,  there  is a single  steady-state  growth  path 
around  which  all countries  eventually  congregate,  not because  of  any  interdependence  but due  to  some 
inherent  limit  to growth.  That  is, countries  face diminishing  returns  in some  form.  Baumol  (1992) and 
Dollar  and Wolff  (1992) focus  mainly  on diminishing  returns  to capital which  lead the growth  rate to rise 
at a decreasing  rate as accumulation  occurs.  The  logic  is purely  neoclassical:  as capital  accumulates  its 
marginal  product  falls and so does the incentive  to invest.  Capital thus  flows to the poor  countries,  labor 
flows  to  the  rich  countries  and  the  growth  rate  in  rich  countries  falls  as  the  capital-labor  ratio  falls. 
Baumol  mentions  two other  diminishing  returns  phenomena  which  potentially  lead to convergence.  One 
is the  “cost  disease  of  handicraft  services,”  that  is the  fact  that  in  certain  endeavors  (medicine,  law, 
performing  arts,  research  and development)  it is impossible  to raise  labor  productivity  beyond  a certain 
level.  Once  a  country  reaches  this  level,  its  productivity  growth  rate  is  constrained.3  The  other 
possibility  is the diminishing  returns  to  educational  attainment:  once  a country’s  population  achieves  a 
certain  level  of  education,  additional  educational  attainment  does  not  lead to  further  productivity  gains. 
The  inevitability  of  convergence  implied  by the  common  forces  view  has  its institutional  counterpart  in 
the  Olson’s  (1982) hypothesis  of  “institutional  ossification”  due  to the  role  of  special-interest  groups  in 
democratic  regimes. 4 4 
The  contagion  model  is  the  case  of  catch-up  based  on  the  ease  of  imitation  compared  to 
innovation.  The  purported  relative  ease  of  catch-up  is rooted  in the  multiple  channels  for  technology 
transfer,  the  international  mobility  of  capital  and  labor  embodied  knowledge,  and  international 
competition.  The  contagion  theory  is  perhaps  the  most  widely  held  theory  of  convergence  among 
economists  .’  Recent  research  in this vein  has largely  been  to select,  in an ud hoc  manner,  the variables 
which  would  be expected  to  encourage  catch-up  and  regress  the  growth  rate  on  these  variables.  Most 
authors  include  a “relative backwardness”  variable  (usually  the per capita GNP gap vis-a-vis  the frontier 
country),  and a size variable to 
. 
degree  of price  distortion,  and 
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control  for increasing  returns.  Barre  (199 1) also includes  trade openness, 
educational  attainment  as explanatory  variables.  Rassekh  (1992) focuses 
while  DeLong  and Summers  (1992) concentrate  on durable  capital goods 
investment.  Lichtenberg  (1992) focuses  on educational  attainment,  and Blomstrom  and Wolff (1992) test 
for  the  role  of multinational  corporations.  Alam  (1992) attempts  to proxy  Abramowitz’s  (1986) notion 
of  “social  capability”  with  an  index  of  “corporatism”  which  measures  the  degree  of  “institutionalized 
negotiation,  bargaining,  collaboration,  and  accord  about  wages  and  ‘incomes  policies’  between 
representatives  of the major  economic  groupings  in the society  (most typically  labour  confederations  and 
employers’  associations)  and  often  including,  in  addition,  representatives  of  government.“’  Nelson 
(1990)  and  Nelson  and  Wright  (1992)  could  also  be  said  to  hold  the  contagion  view,  although  they 
generally  do  not  rely  on  regression  analysis.  For  these  authors  the  catch-up  to  the  U.S.  by  other 
countries  in the post-1972  period  is due to the U.S.  inability to maintain  a dominance  in mass production 
and  in  high-tech  goods  production.  The  causes  of  this  inability  are  due  as  much  to  structural 
developments  in  the  world  economy  (e.g.  the  successful  integration  of  Western  Europe)  as  to  any 
developments  in the  U.S. 
The  emphasis  of the  ad  hoc  contagion  models  is the  explanation  of  convergence.  While  this  is 
a perfectly  valid task,  it avoids  the general  question  of why  a given  country  does or does  not join  the SO- 5 
called  “convergence  club,”  that  is the  group  of  countries  in the  process  of  catching  up  to  the  frontier 
country.  Put  another  way,  the  ud hoc  contagion  models  do  not  attempt  to define  the  characteristics  of 
the threshold  level  of development  required  for  membership  in the  convergence  club. 
What  is the  crucial  level  of  development  at  a  given  historical  moment  to  attain  the  required 
threshold?  The  problem  with  the  common  forces  and the  contagion  models  is their  inability  to account 
for the vast number  of poor  countries  who have failed to converge,  much  less catch up entirely.  The rush 
to  explain  convergence  left  unanswered  (except  in the  negative)  the question  of  why  a large  number  of 
countries  never  were  able to join  the  convergence  club.  A number  of recent  studies  confirm  that many 
countries  have  endured  relative  stagnation  while  only  those  lucky  club  members  chugged  along  on  the 
catch-up  trail  (DeLong,  1988, Baumol.and  Wolff,  1988, Verspagen,  1991, Chatterji,  1992, Blomstrom, 
et al,  1992,  Hikino  and Amsden,  1992).  The  common  forces  model  would  certainly  seem  to fail in the 
face of this evidence  alone,  unless  one  argues  that there  is not enough  time-series  data available to make 
a judgment.  The  contagion  model  is not  necessarily  contradicted  by  this  evidence,  but  it explains  the 
inability  of countries  to catch  up only  in the negative,  that is as the state of not  having  attained  a certain 
level of,  say,  educational  attainment  or capital  accumulation.  Even Baumol  (1992, p.  35) admits,  “[T]he 
line  separating  those  eligible  for  membership  in  the  convergence  club  and  those  foreclosed  from 
membership  has  not been  determined  unambiguously.“’ 
The  third  explanation  of  the  convergence  phenomenon  seeks  to  account  explicitly 
possibility  of  convergence  or  divergence.*  These  models  build  on  what  Abramowitz  terms 
capacities”  and attempt  to identify  the threshold  level of such capabilities  required  for a nation to 
for  the 
“s0cia.l 
diverge 
or  converge.  Such  abilities  may  include,  but  are  certainly  not  limited  to,  the  notion  of  “absorptive 
capacity”  stressed  in the  contagion  literature.  Fagerberg  (1988),  for  example,  stresses  that  contagion 
alone  is  insufficient  for  convergence,  but  must  be  combined  with  appropriate  “national  technological 
activities.”  Hikino  and Amsden  (1992) describe  a process  of development  which  allows for the possibility 6 
of both  convergence  or  divergence  in their  model  of  “late-industrialization,”  which  gives  instititutional 
definition  to  the  threshold  level  of  development  whose  attainment  is  required  for  membership  in  the 
convergence  club.  Three  requirements  for  the  ability  to  implement  such  a development  policy  are  (1) 
a certain  threshold  level  of wealth  accumulation,  (2) a relatively  equal  distribution  of income,  and (3) a 
relatively  well-educated  civil  service.  Absent  these  characteristics,  a country  is likely  to diverge  since 
its  growth  rate  will  not  be  able  to  keep  up  with  that  of  the  leading  countries,  much  less  surpass  it. 
Hodgson’s  (1989,  1991) emphasis  on  the  non-coditiability  of  knowledge--and  thus  the  difftculty  of  its 
international  diffusion--provides  a similar  perspective  on the  convergence  process  as non-inevitable  and 
dependent  on domestic  institutions  and cultural  practices.  Hodgson  (1991) turns the Olson hypothesis  on 
its  head,  stressing  political  pluralism  and  political  disruption  as  indicators  of  social  capabilities,  but 
rejecting  the  notions  that  institutions  naturally  “ossify”  and that  leading  countries  naturally  decline. 
Formal  models  that explicitly  allow for the possibility  of convergence or divergence  tend to stress 
absorptive  capacity  alone.  Verspagen  (1991),  for example,  develops  a simple  model  where  catching-up 
or falling  behind  depends  on the  lagging  country’s  “intrinsic  learning  capability,”  which  determines  the 
rate  of  spillover  of  knowledge  from  the  leading  country.  The  level  of  development  of  infrastructure 
(proxied  by  electricity  generating  capacity)  represents  the  capability  to  assimilate  knowledge  spillovers 
from  the  leading  country.  A learning  capability  in the  laggard  country  above  a certain  level  will  bring 
convergence.  Otherwise,  the  laggard  country’s  growth  rate  remains  below  that  of  the  lead  country. 
Testing  the  model  for  a  sample  of  135  countries,  Verspagen  gets  results  which  support  the  model. 
Chatterji  (1992),  in a model  which  also emphasizes  capacity  to absorb  new  technology,  finds  that there 
exist two  mutually  exclusive  convergence  clubs,  one for wealthy  countries  and one for poor  ones,  where 
the division  between  wealthy  and poor  is determined  endogenously  in the  model.  The  ultimate  level  of 
convergence  for the poor  group  is l/30  the level of income  of the U.S.,  the frontier  country  in the wealth 7 
group.  This  result  confirm’s  Gomulka’s  (1987,  1990) hypothesized  “hat-shape  relationship”  between 
technology  gaps  and growth  rates. 
The  discussion  of  Japan  and  Portugal  below  is an  attempt  to  build  on  this  body  of  work  and 
develop  a model  centering  on endogenous  technical  progress,  external  economies  and trade  in goods  with 
production  characteristics  favorable  or unfavorable  for convergence.  The  idea behind the model  is traced 
back to Adam Smith’s  writings  on trade and uneven  development.  Smith’s underlying  theory of exchange 
led  him  to  the  theory  that  specialization  and  international  trade  may  lead  to  either  convergence  or 
divergence  in  development  and  technology.9.  Smith’s  description  of  economic  and  technological 
divergence  has  its  direct  counterpart  in  modern  positive-feedback  theories  of  trade  and  development. 
Kaldor  (1972,  1985) emphasized  the  cumulative  causation  of  an  initial  productivity  lead  based  on  the 
existence  of dynamic  scale economies.  Given  increasing  returns,  trade  is not automatically  beneficial  to 
all countries.  International  trade  expands  markets  and extends  the division  of labor,  but some  countries 
are left behind  in the  process: 
There  are a number  of factors...  that create spontaneous  tendencies  to imbalance  which  may well 
mean  that  the  growth  of  some  of  the  participants  is  enhanced  while  the  growth  of  others  is 
diminished.  In  contrast  to  the  classical  theory  of  international  trade,  free  trade  or  even  a 
reduction  of  barriers  to  trade  may  stunt  the  growth  of  some  industrial  areas  and  enhance  the 
growth  of others.  Free  trade  therefore  is not necessarily  to the benefit  of each participant,  as it 
is under  the  theories  of  Ricardo,  John  Stuart  Mill,  Heckscher,  Ohlin,  or  Samuelson.  (Kaldor, 
1985:71) 
Krugman  (1981) put a similar general  story of international  trade  into a simple  model.  Given the 
existence  of  external  economies,  the  country  with  a small  head  start  in  an  industry  will  continually 
increase  its productivity  advantage  over  lagging  countries.  In a trade  context  the  model  posits  that the 
opening  of trade  causes  the  “head start”  advanced  countries  to  specialize  in the  external  economies-to- 8 
scale  industries  while  the  lagging  countries  are  forced  out  of  these  industries.  We  do  not  expect 
advantages  to  relative  backwardness  because  continual  productivity  gains  are  caused  by  external 
economies  which  are  not  transferable  as  are  technologies.  Trade  and  time  cause  initial  productivity 
differences  to be magnified;  the  advantages  of relative  backwardness  are negative. 
Our  approach  differs  slightly  from  Kaldor  and  Krugman  by  explicitly  focusing  on  the 
characteristics  of production  that lead goods  to possess  these so-called  dynamic  or non-dynamic  returns. 
The  role  of  international  trade  in  determining  rates  of  convergence  and  divergence  is  that  of  the 
determinant  of  specialization.  In  an abstract  sense,  goods  may  be classified  as either  zero-feedback  or 
positive-feedback  goods,  depending  on  the  scale  economies  and  positive  spillovers  their  production 
generates  in a particular  context,  The production  of zero-feedback,goods  generally  makes use of low-skill 
workers  with  little  labor  force  commitment.  Technology  is often  embodied  in standardized  machinery 
that  has  been  perfected  to  the  point  of  requiring  a  low-skill  operator.  Also,  these  goods  are  often 
produced  with  labor  intensive  techniques,  and  production  “blueprints”  that  are  unrelated  to  positive- 
feedback  goods.  This  implies that technologies  employed  in the production  of these goods  do not benefit 
from  spillovers  of technological  changes  occurring  in other  goods.  Standardization  of both  product  and 
production  process  are characteristics  which  dominate  zero-feedback  goods. 
In contrast,  the production  of positive-feedback  goods  requires  skilled  labor,  and is characterized 
by  technologies  that  are  both  embodied  and  disembodied,  less  standardization  of  both  product  and 
production  technique,  and ease of technology  transfer  both  within  specific  good  categories  and between 
goods.  This  last characteristic  implies  that technology  spillover  is rapid  even  between  different  goods. 
In positive-feedback  goods,  dynamic  returns  dominate  standardization  of product  and production  process. 
The determination  of whether  a good  is of the zero- or positive-feedback  variety  depends  on both 
the  (historically  specific)  technological  characteristics  of  the  good  and  its production  process,  and  the 
institutional  features  of  the  economy  producing  it.  Since  international  trade  tends  to  lead  to  greater 9 
specialization  in production,  it determines  in part whether  a country  captures  positive-feedback,  dynamic 
returns,  or  whether  it  is  dominated  by  zero-feedback  goods.  But  even  a  particularly  favorable 
specialization  pattern  does  not provide  an a nriori  guarantee  of a country’s  convergence.  Many countries 
seek  to  “lock  in”  to  specialization  in  positive-feedback  goods;  only  some  succeed.  The  determining 
factors  are  institutional  capabilities  and  rigidities,  including  political  factors.  While  the  U.S.,  for 
example,  experienced  industrial  labor  supply  and  demand  enhancement  as  a  result  of  19th  century 
productivity  gains  in agriculture,  Portugal’s  concentration  on  agricultural  production  generated  no such 
advantages,  due  to  an  inappropriate  transportation  network  and  land  which  was  poorly  suited  for  the 
particular  crops  that  the  government  promoted.  Moreover,  the  outcome  of  a particular  specialization 
pattern  is historically  contingent:  Both the U.K.  and Japan used linkages  to the textile sector  to generate 
positive  feedbacks  in  the  19th  century,  but  today,  such  a  strategy  would  likely  not  provide  the 
convergence  boost.  Thus  while our  emphasis  is on cumulative  causation,  we stress the role  of Arrovian 
“learning by doing”  as much as Kaldorian  investment-driven  technological  progress.  These  processes  are 
perfectly  compatible.  As  Hodgson  (1991,  p.  157)  remarks,  “Economic  growth  is  predominantly  a 
cognitive,  learning  process  in which the scope of learning  is progressively  extended  by gross  investment.” 
The  postitive-  versus  zero-feedback  perspective  leads  us to  look  at the  types  of  linkages  which 
develop  in an economy  to understand  long term  patterns  of convergence.  A pattern  that allows a country 
to  establish  strong  technological  and  informational  linkages  both  intra-country  and  intercountry  will 
generate  a convergence  path.  Trade  is influential  in building  these  linkages.  Where  these  linkages  are 
weak,  we expect a divergence  path to develop.  Moreover,  once this pattern of convergence  or divergence 
has begun  (i.e.  once  the  path  is determined),  patterns  are self  re-enforcing.  Krugman  (1987,  1991) and 
Arthur  (1989) demonstrate  the difftculty  of overcoming  an initial vicious  path of divergence.  Increasing 
returns  act  to  lock  in  certain  patterns,  and  countries  that  specialized  in  zero-feedback  goods  find 
themselves  outside  the  converging  group.  Breaking  the  pattern  of  divergence  set  by  this  pattern  of 10 
specialization  is found  to be extremely  difftcult.  A simple  model of this process  is developed  in Appendix 
B.  The  model  develops  the zero feedback  - positive  feedback  distinction  to demonstrate  the development 
of two convergence  clubs rather than one.  Countries  that are able to specialize  in positive-feedback  goods 
converge  at ever  increasing  productivity  levels while  those countries  specializing  in zero-feedback  goods 
converge  at a low and stagnant  level.  Thus,  we show divergence  between  groups  and convergence  within 
groups. 
3.  Methodolom 
There  has been  a diverse  set of research  methods  employed  to assess the degree  of convergence 
of national  productivity  levels.  The  simplest  approach  is to correlate  “technology  gaps”  in some  initial 
period  with  growth  rates.  The  former  is often  proxied  by the nation’s  level  of productivity  compared  to 
that  of  the  frontier  country.  A  negative  correlation  provides  evidence  of  convergence.  The  most 
cormnonly  used  productivity  measure  is total  factor  productivity.”  Total  factor  productivity  is defined 
as the value  of output  per  dollar  of  inputs.  In 
TFP  = 
general, 
(ViYi)  /  Cwjxj)  (1) 
where  TFP  is total  factor  productivity,  Y are  outputs,  X are  inputs  and  v  and  w  are output  and  input 
weights  respectively.  All studies  of  convergence  based  on TFP  growth  assume  only  two  inputs  (labor 
and capital)  and constant  returns  to scale Cobb-Douglas  technology.  TFP  is then  equivalent  to the Solow 
residual,  so-called  because  of its discussion  and measurement  in Solow’s  (1957) seminal  article.  Letting 
A represent  output  not  explained  by capital  and  labor  use,  the production  function  is: 
Y  =  A(L’Kl-=)  (2) 
where  Y is aggregate  output,  L and K are aggregate  labor and capital respectively  and 01  is labor’s  share 
of  income.  The  translog  index  of TFP  is defined  by taking  logs  and solving  for the  Solow  residual: TFP  = InA  = 1nY  - alnL  - (1-a)lnK 
11 
(3) 
The  wage  share  parameter  Q serves  as the  weighting  scheme  for  measuring  input  use. 
The  validity  and  interpretation  of the  Solow  residual,  and the  aggregate  production  function  on 
which  it is based,  came under  intense  scrutiny  in the  “capital controversy”  of the  1960’s and  1970’s.  For 
a number  of years  after this debate,  the use of the aggregate  production  function  waned.  In a disturbing 
development  for  those  who  acknowledged  the  validity  of  the  capital  critique,  the  aggregate  production 
function  has  made  a resurgence  in research  on  convergence.‘* 
The capital controversy  concerned  the issue of the interdependence  of income distribution  and the 
value  of the  capital  stock.  The  Cambridge,  U.K.  critique  of the aggregate  production  function  was that 
the value  of the  capital stock  is a function  of the distribution  of income  between  wages  and profits.  The 
neoclassical  model  is flawed  because  the value  of the  capital  stock  cannot  be known  until  the profit  rate 
is known,  but the profit  rate (equal to the marginal  product  of capital)  is unknowable  without  knowledge 
of  the  value  of  the  (aggregate)  capital  stock.  One  implication  of  this  circularity  critique  is that  the 
aggregate  production  function  has  been  shown  to  be  invalid  except  within  the  confines  of  a  one- 
commodity  world  (Garegnani,  1970), or  when  the  capital-labor  ratios  and  technologies  are equal  in the 
production  of  all goods  (Samuelson,  1962). 
The practical  problem  in the use of the aggregate  production  function  is the potential  bias it brings 
to the analysis.  Important  for the purposes  of this paper  are the  implications  of this critique  for empirical 
analysis  of convergence.  If the  neoclassical  theory  of distribution  is invalid,  and the value  of capital  is 
a function  of distribution  (which  it must  be in any general  aggregate  production  model),  then  two  major 
problems  arise for the analysis of convergence.  First,  the capital stock data used  in the empirical  analysis 
do  not  account  for  the  role  of  distribution  and  may  be  distorted  as a result.  Second,  estimates  of  the 
Solow  residual,  also based  on  this discredited  growth  model,  may  also be distorted.‘2 12 
TFP  growth  (TFPG)  is defined  as the  amount  of  growth  of output  not accounted  for by  growth 
in labor  and  capital: 
TFPG  =  Y^-  aL-  (l-a)I?  (4) 
where  a  A over  a  variable  represents  the  time  derivative  in  the  log  of  the  variable.  Of  note  in  this 
common  formulation  is the  assumed  constancy  of  cy with  respect  to time.  Regardless  of  the  weighting 
scheme  chosen  to  perform  the  TFPG  calculation,  CY  is  a  constant.  This  specification  leaves  such 
calculations  vulnerable  to the critique  of Shaikh  (1980,  1987) that the residual  will not measure  technical 
progress,  as it is so often  described.  Instead,  the residual  will reflect  distributional  changes.  According 
to  Shaikh  (1980,  p.  SS),  “Solow’s  measure  of  technical  change  is  merely  a weighted  average  of  the 
growth  rates  of  the  wage  rate,  w  and  the  rate  of  profit,  r.“13  Shaikh  shows  that  any  data  (thus  the 
“humbug  production  function”)  will  provide  a  good  fit  of  a  constant  returns  to  scale  Cobb-Douglas 
specification  assuming  the  wage share  is relatively  constant.  Hsing  (1992) further  develops  the  critique 
of the  aggregate  production  function  by demonstrating  that the measure  of technical  change  is itself 
inconsistent  with  neutrality  and  homogeneity.  Hsing  further  shows  that 
to neutrality  and homogeneity  results  in a production  identity  rather  than 
The  importance  of this  critique  for the  current  purposes  is that  it 
reformulating  $  to  conform 
a production  function. 
implies  that TFP  may  capture 
things  other  than  technical  progress  and  may  simply  represent  changes  in  distribution.  In  their 
comparison  of  the  convergence  of TFP  with  that  of direct  labor  productivity,  Dollar  and Wolff  (1992) 
show  that  in  the  1963-1972  period  TFP  converged  faster  than  labor  productivity,  with  the  opposite 
occurring  following  1972.  Following  the  above  discussion,  this  result  may  simply  reflect  that technical 
change  is embodied  in inputs  and that the convergence  of technologies  may not have stopped  since  1973. 
The lack of TFP  convergence  in the later period  may reflect a lack of change  in the functional  distribution 
of income  in that period  across  the sample  countries,  not a lack of diffusion  of technology.  Dowrick  and 13 
Nguyen  (1989) find  that TFP  converged  more  rapidly  than per  capita  income.  This  result  could  reflect 
a bias  in TFP.  Rapid  TFP  convergence  could  be based on distributional  trends,  not technical  change. 
To  avoid  such  ambiguities  we  propose  the  use  of  a concept  of  capital  as heterogeneous.  This 
vertically  integrated  approach,  using  the  work  of  Leontief  (1966)  and  Pasinetti  (1981),  avoids  the  bias 
inherent  in  the  homogeneous  capital  measures.  With  input-output  data  available  for  a  considerable 
number  of countries  over  a significant  period  of time,  there  is no reason  not to apply such  a methodology 
to  international comparisons  and thus  to the  question  of  convergence  itself.14  It  is to  this  task  that  we 
now  turn. 
The  approach  adopted  in this paper  is the vertically  integrated  measure  of productivity  that looks 
at direct  and indirect  labor productivity  in a sector.  Vertical  integration  captures  the  interdependence  of 
sectors,  providing  a  more  comprehensive  measurement  of  labor  productivity  than  simple  direct 
measures. I5 
The  vector  of vertically  integrated  labor  coefficients  (vile’s)  is calculated  as follows: 
v =  1(I-Al-l 
where  v  =  the  lxn  vector  of vile’s 
I =  the  lxn  vector  of direct  labor  coefficients 
I  =  the  nxn  identity  matrix 
A  =  the  nxn transactions  matrix 
Not  only  is v a more  comprehensive  measure  than  a direct  measure  but  it also  captures  dynamic  scale 
economies,  since  productivity  in a given  vertically  integrated  sector  is a function  of  productivity  in all 
its intermediate  sectors.  Because  of the  wide  variance  in input  composition  among  final  goods  sectors, 
we would  not expect  each sector  to share  equally the advantages  of dynamic  scale economies.  Vertically 
integrated  analysis  thus  captures  the  importance  of  Kaldor-Young  dynamic  returns  at  a disaggregated 14 
level.  The  simple  direct  measure  fails  to  capture  the  dynamic  returns  since  each  final  goods  sector’s 
performance  is considered  in isolation  from  all others. 
In inputoutput  analysis  changes  in production  over  time  take the  form  of  changes  in the  matrix 
of technical  coefficients  - a vector  for each sector.  However,  the direction  and magnitude  of this change 
is ambiguous.  Vertically  integrated  analysis  reduces  the  inputoutput  current  flows  matrix  to  a vector, 
and  thus  a  scalar  for  each  sector.  Productivity  change  can  be  measured  as  changes  in  this  single 
coefficient.  Such  a measure  of technical  change  is unambiguous,  yet  retains  the  information  provided 
by  input-output  tablesI 
The  United  Nations  ECE  input-output  data base  allows  the  use  of  vertically  integrated  analysis 
in an assessment  of  international  productivity  divergence,  for  a limited  set of countries  over  the  period 
1959-1975.*’  Table  1 shows  the  sectoral  breakdown  of  the  input-output  sectors.  Convergence  is 
measured  in  two  ways:  first,  the  ratio  of  highest  to  lowest  vile  across  countries  is  calculated.  An 
increase  in this  ratio  implies  divergence  and a decrease  implies  convergence.  Second,  the coefficient  of 
variation’*  (cv)  in  each  vertically  integrated  sector  across  countries  over  time  is calculated.  Declines 
in the cv  imply  convergence  and  increases  imply  divergence  in a given  sector.  The  results  of these  two 
measures  are presented  in Tables  II and  III. 
The  bottom  line of Table  II shows  the  median  of the  sectoral  ratios  of highest  to  lowest  vile by 
year.  This  ratio declined  from  4.86  in  1959 to 3.62  in  1975, implying  that on average  the country  with 
the  lowest  productivity  in  each  sector  partly  “caught  up”  to  the  leading  country  in  that  sector.  This 
provides  support  for  the  Gershenkron  hypothesis,  and  is consistent  with  a number  of the  recent  studies 
discussed  above. 
Looking  at the coefficient  of variation  of specific  sectors  in Table  III,  no clear-cut  tendency  for 
divergence  or convergence  is observed  over  the entire period.  The  number  of sectors  in which  there  was 1C 
convergence  was exactly equal to the number  of sectors  in which divergence  was observed  over the  1959- 
1975 period. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  comparison  of  end  points  (1959  and  1975)  hides  some  interesting 
fluctuations  over the  sample  period.  Specifically,  there was considerable  convergence  between  1959 and 
1970, and then  equally  large  divergence  between  1970 and  1975.  In Table  III we see that between  1959 
and  1965,  11 of  14 sectors  showed  convergence.  Again,  between  1965 and  1970, convergence  occurred 
in  11  sectors.  But from  1970 to  1975,  convergence  occurred  in  only  4  sectors:  metal  ore  and  other 
mining,  basic metals,  machinery,  transport  and other  manufactured  goods,  and construction.  Moreover, 
the  median  coefficient  of  variation  rose  from  .4139  in  1970 to  .6138  in  1975.  The  median  for  1975 
increases  almost  to the  original  1959 level  of  .6180.  This  break  in the  convergence  tendency  observed 
in the  1975 data  is confirmed  by  the  ratios  in Table  II,  comparing  the  highest  to lowest  productivity  in 
each sector  over  time.  The  median  of the ratios of highest  to lowest  sectoral  productivity  levels declines 
steadily  from  1959 (4.86)  to  1970 (2.92)  and then jumps  back up  in  1975, practically  to  its  1965 level. 
The  picture  from  this sample  is thus  considerably  more  muddy  than  the Dollar  and Wolff  (1992) results 
indicate,  and requires  an explanation  that goes  beyond  the  simple  Gershenkron  hypothesis.19 
The  evidence  from  the  input-output  study  demonstrates  that  simple  monotonic  convergence  did 
not  occur  at  the  sectoral  level  in  the  sample  countries  for  which  input-output  data  are  available. 
According  to  Table  II,  in  1959 and  1965,  Portugal  was the  low  productivity  country  in three  sectors: 
metal ore and other  mining,  non-metallic  mineral  products,  and construction.  In 1970 and  1975, Portugal 
was  still  the  low  productivity  country  in  the  same  three  sectors,  but  in  1970  it  became  the  low 
productivity  country  in seven  sector?’  and  in  1975 it was the  low productivity  country  in eleven  of the 
fourteen  sectors.  Japan was the low productivity  country  in six sectors  in 1959,  10 sectors  in 1965, three 
in  1970 and only  1 in  1975.  The  data  indicate  that over  the  1959-1975 period,  Portugal  failed  to join 
the  convergence  club  while  Japan  became  a card-carrying  member. 16 
Per  capita  income  figures  roughly  mirror  those  of  the  sectoral  productivity  values.  Table  IV 
reports  per  capita  income  levels  for  each  country  in the  sample,  plus  the  United  States,  over  the  same 
time  period.  This  table  indicates  that Japan  rivaled  Portugal  as the least developed  country  as measured 
by  per  capita  income  in  1959.  Over  the  sample  period  the  ratio  of  per  capita  income  for  Japan  and 
Norway  (the  leader  in  the  sample)  jumps  from  .41  in  1959 to  .76  in  1975,  while  the  same  ratio  for 
Portugal  and  Norway  moves  from  .28  in  1959 to  .36  in  1975.  These  numbers  amount  to  a  rate  of 
convergence  of 59%  for Japan  and only  24%  for  Portugal.  The  numbers  for the other  countries  in the 
sample  as well  as for  the  United  States may  also be calculated. 
Given  Portugal’s  apparent  divergence  in  most  sectors,  it  is  interesting  to  ask  if  the  lack  of 
unambiguous  convergence  in the  sample’ countries  can be fully  explained  by  the  inclusion  of  Portugal. 
To  address  this,  we  have  recalculated  the  ratios  without  Portugal.  Table  V reports  total  productivity 
ratios  for  the  low  and  high  productivity  country  in  each  sector.  By  excluding  Portugal  we  note  that 
overall  convergence  did  occur  between  the  sample  countries  in  each  period.  The  median  total 
productivity  ratio  falls from  4.29  in  1959 to  1.91 in  1975.  Moreover,  the  median  ratio fell  in the  1970 
to  1975  sample  period.  The  strong  divergence  shown  in  Table  11 can  be  attributed  to  Portugal’s 
performance  in relation  to the other  sample  countries.  The convergence  trend  does show signs of slowing 
during  the  1970 to  1975 period  for  Germany,  Italy,  Japan  and Norway.  This  is shown  by the  fact that 
even  though  the median  ratio fell,  7 of the  14 sectors  diverged  over  this period.  This  is compared  to 5 
sectors  diverging  from  1959 to  1965 and  4  sectors  diverging  from  1965 to  1970.  However,  the  fact 
remains  that  Portugal  is responsible  for  the  median  divergence  reported  in Table  II.  Portugal’s  role  is 
again  confirmed  using  the  coefficients  of  variation  for  Germany,  Italy,  Japan  and  Norway  reported  in 
Table  VI.  Between  1959  and  1975,  there  was  divergence  in  only  one  sector  (petroleum  and  coal 
products)  and the median  coefficient  of variation  falls from  .6375 in  1959 to  .2818  in  1975.  Moreover, 17 
from  1970 to  1975 the  median  falls  from  .3506.  The  divergence  observed  in Tables  II  and III  for  the 
1970 to  1975 period  is due  to the divergence  of the least developed  country,  Portugal. 
The  remainder  of  the paper  is devoted  to  applying  our  theoretical  framework  to the  question  of 
why  Portugal  and Japan  experienced  such different  paths over  our  sample  period.  We have  argued  that 
the  input-output  approach  is preferable  to  the  aggregate  production  function  in assessing  the  degree  of 
convergence.  But  in  order  to  explain  the  convergence/divergence  tendencies  we  must  push  our 
methodological  reassessment  further.  While  most  attempts  to  explain  convergence  consist  of  cross 
sectional  regression  analysis,  we propose  an historical  account  of political  and institutional  factors  in the 
particular  cases of Japan and Portugal.  Implicit  in this methodological  choice  is the belief that regression 
analysis  is  insufftcient  to  capture  the  theoretical  dynamics  of  positive  feedbacks  associated  with 
specialization  and  international  trade.  Our  methodological  choice  thus  reflects  a realist  perspective,  in 
which  economic  and political  institutions  play  a fundamental  role  and are irreducible  to the  activities  of 
individual  agents.  In  Lawson’s  (1993)  words,  these  social  structures  are  “inescapably  geohistorically 
grounded.  ” 
4.  A Tale  of Two  Countriq 
Japan 
The data covering  the period  from  the late  1950’s to the middle  of the  1970’s clearly  support  the 
view  that  Japan  experienced  rapid  convergence  toward  the  developed  countries.  Further  inspection 
reveals  that this  pattern  is part  of a long-run  trend.  Table  VII  reports  direct  productivity  ratios  for  the 
U.S.,  Norway,  and Japan from  1870 to  1979.  These  data reveal a clear convergence  path over the entire 
period.  From  1870 to  1938 Japan  converged  toward  the  United  States  and  Norway.  In  1870,  the 
measure  of productivity  differential  between  the U.S.  and Japan stood  at .9975,  but by  1938 the measure 
was down  to  .6679.  The  destruction  of Japan during  World  War II is evident.  In  1950 the measure  was 18 
.8612  and  it did  not  drop  below  the  1938 level  until  1970.  During  the  period  from  1960 to  1973 (the 
approximate  sampling  period  above) we see continuous  convergence.  The  rapid  convergence  from  1960 
to  1970 appears  as a catch-up  for lost ground  from  the war.  Generally,  the periods  before  and after this 
show  persistent,  if  unsteady,  convergence.  The  results  from  a comparison  to  Norway  are  extremely 
similar.  A persistent  convergence  path  is demonstrated  before  the war,  followed  by rapid  catch-up  from 
1950-1973. 
As  Japan  developed,  it  directed  resources  toward  manufactures  and  away  from  primary 
products. 21 Table  VIII  reports  data on Japan’s  exports  from  1874 to  1970.  Clearly  the  trend  is toward 
manufacturing  sectors,  From  Table  IX we note  that  in  1874 the  ratio of manufacturing  exports  to  total 
was  .423.  This  ratio  continuously  rises to  1970.  WWII does  not.even  stop this  trend.  By far the  most 
important  sector  in  manufacturing  exports  is  textiles.  In  1874  the  ratio  of  textile  exports  to  total 
manufacturing  exports  is  571.  This  ratio  grows  to  .628  in  1895 and  maintains  its  dominance  until 
1935.p  From  1935 to  1970 the  ratio  falls  from  .545 to  .120,  with the  sharpest  decline  occurring  after 
1955.  The  decline  in export  performance  in textiles  is consistent  with  the  total  labor  productivity  data 
which  show that Japan became  the low productivity  country  in textiles by  1970, and was only better  than 
Portugal  in  1975 (see Tables  II and V). 
The  data  indicate  that  manufacturing  in general,  and textiles  in particular,  played  a major  role 
in  Japan’s  convergence.  We  now  further  develop  this  line  of  argument  by  focusing  on  textiles  and 
manufacturing.  Specifically,  we focus on the  role played  by positive  feedbacks  in Japan’s  convergence, 
and  argue  that  external  economies  played  a major  role  in the  early  development  of  the  textile  industry 
and  external  economies  generated  by  the  military  provided  for  the  later  growth  (1900-1920)  and 
development  of the heavier  industries  such as chemicals,  metals and machinery.  These  developments  set 
Japan on the  convergence  path that we observe  from  1959 to  1975.  This  path was severed  by WWII but 
quickly  reestablished  after  the  war. 19 
9  Textiles 
As indicated  above,  the  textile  industry  was extremely  important  in Japan’s  early  development. 
The  industry  was  Japan’s  first  large-scale,  modem  industry  and  was  responsible  for  a  third  of  all 
industrial  production  from  1890- 1930 (Yamazawa,  1990:70).  Table IX documents  that textiles  accounted 
for over  half of all manufacturing  exports  until  1939.  By 1920, Japan passed  Great Britain as the world’s 
leading  exporter  of cotton  textiles.  The  growth  of textile  exports  from  1900 to  1935 is astonishing.  In 
1900 textile  exports  were valued  at 97.1  million  yen at constant  prices,  by  1935 the export  value reached 
1665.1  million,  an  increase  of  1600  percent.  Moreover,  the  growth  of  the  cotton  textile  industry 
provided  important  support  for downstream  industries  in spinning  machinery  and tools so that by the late 
1920’s spinning  machinery  was a net exporting  industry  (Akamatsu,  1961). 
Government  involvement  in  cotton  textiles  began  early.  Japan’s  trade  surpluses  of 
Restoration  period  quickly  turned  into  large  deficits.  From  1874 to  1880 the  total  deficit  at 
prices  was 460.5  million  yen,  92.9  million  more  than total exports.  Textile  imports  accounted 
the  pre- 
constant 
for 45% 
of  all  imports  and  the  value  of  these  imports  exceeded  the  total  value  of  exportsp  Because  of  their 
importance,  the government  began  an extensive  import  substitution  program  in cotton  textiles.  This  was 
an important  decision.  Textiles  proved  to be  a positive  feedback  industry,  useful  for  its technological 
spillovers,  its demonstration  effects  and  its downstream  industry  benefits. 
The government  began  by buying  two cotton  spinning  plants  in  1878, and in  1879 it also bought 
ten  more  plants  for  sale  on  easy terms  to  private  investors  and  provided  financing  for  three  additional 
plants.  “[Tlhe  government  hoped  that  its new  nonmilitary  industries  [cotton  and  wool  textiles]  would 
have a demonstration  effect  in familiarizing  Japanese with factory  production,  training  administrative  and 
technical  staff,  and  accumulating  experience  that  could  be  made  generally  available.”  (Crawcour, 
1988:612)  This  effort  paid  large  dividends  even  though  the  government-run  enterprises  failed  to  make 
a profit.  “[qhe  State shouldered  the  early  risks,  reconnoitered  the  path  of technological  advance,  and LV 
patronized  many  private  ventures  which  followed  on  its heels.”  (Lockwood,  1955507)  From  1883 to 
1893 a large  number  of  spinning  companies  were  established  without  government  aid,  and  by  1895 a 
small  trade  surplus  in  textiles  developed.  The  new  private  companies  learned  a  great  deal  from  the 
government’s  operations  and failures.  In 1884 the first major plant,  the Osaka Spinning  Company,  began 
production  using  cheap  Chinese  cotton  and  steam  power.  This  factory  was  also built  much  larger  than 
the  early  government  ones;  10,500  spindles  compared  to 2000,  allowing  the  firm  to take  advantage  of 
scale economies  (Yamazawa,  1990).  Within four years the operation  was making  large profits  and paying 
high  dividends.  In  1888, the Japan  Cotton  Spinners’  Association  was organized.  This  organization  was 
developed  to ensure  that technology,  production,  and cost  information  flowed  freely  between  producers. 
Its purpose  was to ensure  large  and continuous  external  economies  for  all its members.% 
The  cotton  spinning  industry  went  through  several  stages  of  development.  First  was  the 
importation  of technology.  In  1882, the  Osaka  company  ordered  its plant  design  and all its machinery 
from  the  Platt Brothers,  a British  engineering  company.  Moreover,  the company  made  extensive  use of 
the Platt Brothers’  technical  expertise.  Foreign  technicians  generally  played 
of technology  to the Japanese  industry. 
Second,  the Japanese  took  the  foreign  technology  and  then  adapted 
a major  role  in the transfer 
it to  its own  requirements. 
By running  factories  at two  twelve-hour  shifts  per day,  and only  resting  the  machines  two  or three  days 
a month,  the  effective  labor-capital  ratio  was two  and one-fifths  higher  in Japan  than  in Britain  (Ranis, 
1957).  This resulted  in a higher  depreciation  rate that allowed Japanese  cotton  spinning  fw  to maintain 
the  best  techniques  rather  than  produce  with  technologically  dated  machines.  Advances  from  mules  to 
reels and the development  of bundling  press  equipment  provide  excellent  examples  (Saxonhouse,  1974). 
The  Japan  Cotton  Spinners  Association  also  played  a  major  role  in  insuring  that  all  firms 
maintained  the latest techniques  by  insuring  the  rapid  dissemination  of the best possible  information  for 
its members. 21 
The  following  information,  broken  down  by  firms,  was  published  on  a  monthly  basis  in  the 
Association’s  journal..  .  (1) Average  number  of spindles  operated  per day;  (2) Working  days per 
month;  (3) Working  hours  per  day;  (4) Yarn produced  by count;  (5) Raw  cotton  consumed;  (6) 
Workers,  male  and female;  and (7) Wages,  male and female.. .  [Clomplete  cost data for certain 
mills  were  [also]  occasionally  published...  Fe  journal  also]  translated  particularly  interesting 
articles  appearing  in foreign  language  journals.  (Saxonhouse,  1974: 160) 
The  Association  was very  influential  and always  encouraged  its members  to share  the  costs  and 
benefits  of technological  acquisition  and development.  This  cooperation  meant  that “the cost of acquiring 
technological  information  for  any  given  Japanese  spinning  firm  was  extremely  low  by  international 
standards”  (ibid:  163). 
Finally,  the  success  of  the  cotton  spinning  industry  led,  through  the  Association,  to  the 
development  of  downstream  indigenous  industries  producing  spinning  tools  and  machinery.25  The 
borrowing  of British technology  led to Japan’s first major  internationally  competitive  nonmilitary  machine 
industry.  The  Japanese  made  their  first  copies  of  English  hank-cop  reelers  in  1888.  By  1892 no  new 
orders  for  English  hank-cop  reelers  were  made,  and by  1907 no orders  for any English  machinery  were 
made  (ibid.:  155). 
From  a perspective  that  emphasizes  cumulative  causation  and  external  economies  (i.e.  positive 
feedbacks),  we are led to conclude  that the  success  of textiles  in Japan  was the direct  result  of an active 
pursuit  of  foreign  technological  knowledge  and  its dissemination  by  the  Association.  This  led  to  the 
development  of domestic  downstream  industries  which  could  develop  important  indigenous  technologies 
leading  to still further  development  of other  industries.  Cumulative  effects,  begun  by textiles,  impacted 
both  on  the  industry  itself  and  on  other  industries  in the  economy.  In  explaining  the  convergence  of 
Japan  over  the  period  to  1975,  it is fundamental  to  look  at the  early  development  of textiles  as a prime 
element  in  the  story.  Japan’s  first  modem  manufacturing  industry  developed  by  borrowing  foreign 22 
technology  which  it  was  quickly  able  to  assimilate,  copy  and  improve.  Many  of  the  day-today 
improvements  in  technology  which  resulted  from  cumulative  experience  in  production  were  quickly 
disseminated  to  all firms  by  the  Association.  The  government  began  the  industry  with  the  intention  of 
creating  an  increasing  returns,  spillover  industry  that  would  propel  the  entire  economy  forward.  The 
early  decision  to  promote  textiles  helped  to  set  Japan  on  a path  of  convergence  toward  the  western 
powers. 
ii)  The  Role of the Military 
Another  major  element  in the  story 
economies  from  its  military  build-up  aided 
of  convergence  is the  early  Japanese  militarism.  External 
the  development  of  textiles  and  led  to  the  development  of 
Japan’s  heavy  industry  including  metals,  machinery,  and later,  chemicals. 
Several  writers  have  argued  that Japanese  militarism  was a major  drag  on  the  economy  during 
the  Meiji  Restoration. 26 Much  of this  work  focuses  on the  increased  taxation  and government  spending 
brought  on  by  Japan’s  expansionism  as  evidence  of  its  growth-retarding  influence.  However,  other 
writers  have  concluded  that Japan’s  military  build-up  played  a great  part  in its  “industrial  revolution.” 
“Imperialism..  .  coincided  with rapid  industrialization,”  and brought  Japan the status it craved  as a major 
power  (Iriya,  1989).  We  argue  that Japanese  militarism  did  play  a substantial  role  in the  development 
of light  and heavy  industry,n  with  the greatest  impact  coming  from  the  increased  demand  for  industrial 
products  and the technology  disseminated  to build these  products.  The  latter aspect  is emphasized  here. 
The military  was a center for the dissemination  of high technology  capital equipment  and technical 
expertise  to private  industry  in Japan.  Yamarnura  (1977) provides  a rough  measure  of the technological 
gulf  that  existed  between  military  arsenals  (including  satellite  plants  and  other  government  financed 
factories  created  for  the  military),  and  private  shipyards  and  factories.  He  measures  what  he  calls 
“prime-mover  capacity”  measured  in horse  power  for both  military  and non-military  industry  from  1899 23 
to  1912.  The  number  of  workers  in  each  sector  is  divided  by  this  capacity  variable  to  obtain  a 
productivity  measure.  Military  arsenals  are shown  to be 42%  more  productive  in  1899 and 5.5  % more 
productive  in  1912.  The  technology  gap  was substantial  during  this period,  and the size of the  gap was 
increasing.  The  questions  concerning  us  here  are  how  the  military  obtained  and  disseminated  the 
technology. 
Quickly  after rising  to power,  Meiji leaders  moved  to increase  Japan’s  military  power.  By  1880 
four  arsenals  with  satellite  piants  and three  government  shipyards  were operating  to supply  the military. 
The  government  shipyards  were the first to build  iron ships  in Japan.  Most of the technology  necessary 
to  build  modern  military  equipment  was  bought  and  borrowed  from  abroad.  “[IIn  1884,  the  arsenal 
[Tokyo]  had  Belgian,  French,  and  German  engineers  and  foremen,  imported  machinery,  [and]  2,094 
workers.  .  .  .  ”  (Yamamura  1977: 114)  Other arsenals  in Osaka,  Yokosuka  and Tsukiji  also developed  early 
by  the  same  process  of  importing  technology  in  the  form  of  capital  equipment  and  technicians.  To 
supplement  the  flow  of  foreign  technology,  many  Japanese  engineers  were  sent  abroad  to  acquire 
knowledge.  The  development  of machine-tool  factories  and 
basic pattern. 
shipyards  developed  according  to the  same 
The  importance  of  this  technological  acquisition  by the  military  was  that  it resulted  in a rapid 
dissemination  of the technology  to private  firms  at low costs. 28 This process  of dissemination  took many 
forms  including  allowing  firms  to  purchase  foreign  (and  arsenal-produced)  machinery  owned  by  the 
government  at  subsidized  rates,  giving  no-interest  loans  to  firms  purchasing  technology,  and  direct 
technical  assistance. 
The  rapid  growth  of  technical  knowledge  by  the  arsenals  and  the  rapid  pace  of  the  spillovers 
continued,  and  was  accelerated  by  the  Sino-Japanese  War  (1895),% and  the  war  with  Russia  in  1904. 
“[qhe  most  significant  effects  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  were  the  rapid  dissemination  of  modern 
technology  to a large  number  of private  firms  and a sudden  accelerated  growth  in the fledgling  and often 24 
struggling  private  machine  and machine-tool  makers  who  received  increased  and timely  military  demand 
and technological  assistance. ’  (Yamamura,  1977: 121) This process  of technological  spillover  led directly 
to the development  of  endogenous  technical  progress  in private  factories  and shipyards.  The  combined 
effects  of  the  transfer  and  development  of  technology  resulted  in  Japan’s  private  shipyards  being  as 
advanced  as  any  in  Europe  by  1912.”  These  advances  resulted  in  the  increased  competitiveness  of 
Japan  in international  markets,  allowing  Japan to benefit  greatly  from  WWI and to establish  new trading 
arrangements  and expand  exports.  Most  important,  however,  is that the technological  spillovers  created 
in Japan’s  early  industrial  efforts  set it on a path of continued  convergence  toward  the Western  powers. 
Once  this  convergence  path  was  established,  it  created  the  opportunities  for  its  maintenance.  The 
conditions  necessary  for the  rapid  rate of convergence  we observed  from  1959 to  1975 in Tables  II and 
III  were  laid  years  earlier  by Japan’s  decisions  to  import  substitute  in cotton  textiles  and  to develop  as 
a  major  military  power.  The  success  of  these  policies  as  a development  strategy  resulted  from  the 
assimilation  of western  technology  and the  rapid  rate of spillover  of technology  within  the  industry  and 
the  economy.  In  essence,  the  decision  to  industrialize  by encouraging  positive  feedback  industries  set 
Japan  on the  convergence  path  that we observe  in the data to  1975. 
Portugal 
Portugal  provides  an  interesting  case  study  against  the  simple  Gershenkron  hypothesis.  By the 
1950’s the  major  roadblocks  to  rapid  convergence  had been  removed.  Yet,  in productivity  terms,  this 
country  diverged  from  the  other  countries  in our  sample.  This  section  reviews  the  historical  record  of 
Portugal  to argue  that its trade  relations  and long  established  trade patterns  may have played  a vital role. 
The  question  is not  if Portugal  developed  over  the  sample  period.  It did.  Table  VI shows  that 
Portugal’s  per  capita GDP grew  at about the same  rate as Norway’s.  Krugman  and Macedo  (1981:54- 
55)  characterize  Portugal  by  1973 as  “fairly  typical  of  the  group  of  middle  income  nations  sometimes L.J 
referred  to  as...  ‘nits’,”  adding  that  Portugal  was  “able to  achieve  rapid  economic  growth  during  the 
1960s  and  early  1970s  via  increased  trade,  [and]  exploiting  their  relatively  abundant  supplies  of 
semiskilled  industrial  workers.”  Portugal  did  develop,  but  it  did  not  converge  in  absolute  terms  as 
Gershenkron  would  lead us to  expect.  Why? 
The Fascist government  of Oliveira Salazar can partially  explain both.  When the new government 
took  power  in  1928,  Salazar  began  building  his  “economic  corporation”  which  was  set  up  to  link 
government  and business.  A leading  historian  of  Portugal  wrote  that,  “the corporate  system  built up an 
economically  organized  country,  an  interventionist  state  essentially  different  from  the  liberal,  ‘laissez- 
faire’  republican  order. ”  (Marques,  1976:180)  A  large  part  of  this  system  was  devoted  to  the 
development  of  infrastructure.  The  total  road  network  more  than  doubled  from  1925 to  1950.  Port 
facilities  were  extensively  improved  so  as  to  allow  larger  ships  and  more  traffic.  Telegraphs  and 
telephones  were  also greatly  expanded.  “[T]he public  works  policy  bore  fruit,  making  possible  - along 
with the general  expansion  of Europe  - the rapid  economic  development  of Portugal  in the  1950s and the 
1960s.”  (ibid.:  198) 
Still,  productivity  convergence  did  not occur.  Several  reasons  can be given  for  this.  First  was 
Salazar’s antidemocratic  bent.  Examples  of this include harsh  censorship  rules,  the active Secret Police, 
and the aggressive  National  Guard.  Salazar (a former  university  professor)  was also extremely  suspicious 
of intellectuals,  resulting  in Portugal’s  high  illiteracy  rates.  Because of this anti-education  bias,  Portugal 
fell  further  behind  the  rest  of  Europe  in  terms  of  science  and  technology  creation.32  Second  was 
Portugal’s  major  resource  commitment  to  keeping  its  remaining  colonies.  However,  some  economic 
analyses  suggest  that the  captive  markets  and cheap supplies  of raw materials  more  than offset  Portugal’s 
military  and  administrative  expenses  in  keeping  the  colonies.  (Stallings,  1981)  And,  “the  war  [in 
Angola]  became  a factor  of economic  growth.  It even  encouraged  Portuguese  industries  connected  with 
the  army.”  (Lucena,  1979:77) 26 
Finally,  and  importantly,  Salazar  made  a decision  early  in his  regime  to  emphasize  a stagnant 
non-increasing  returns  industry,  grain.  The  main  concern  here  was  to  attain  self-sufftciency  in  grain 
production.  In  1929 Salazar  began  the  cmpanh  do  trig0  (wheat  campaign).  The  1930’s saw  vast 
amounts  of resources  devoted  to increasing  the harvests,  and agricultural  land and wheat output  continued 
to increase  to the  1960’s.  The  results  of this  campaign  were  disastrous,  most  soils were  never  properly 
conditioned  for  grain  production  and per  acre  yields  eventually  fell.  (Marques,  1976) 
Agriculture  is not necessarily  a constant  returns  industry.  Rapid technical  progress  in agriculture 
has made  productivity  increases  very  rapid  in many  countries.  However,  for  Portugal  this  was not  the 
case.  Even  though  the  government  encouraged  and  protected  agriculture,  no  serious  attempt  was  ever 
made  to modernize  that sector’s  archaic  production  methods  (Murteira,  1979).”  Even  with the original 
goal  of  self-sufficiency,  agricultural  imports  of grains,  fish  and meat  accounted  for  13% of  imports  by 
1973.  The  resources  poured  into  agriculture  over  the  years  meant  that  when  Portugal  finally  made  a 
serious  transition  from  agriculture  to  manufacturing  in the  1950’s and  1960’s,  it began  much  further 
behind  its major  European  trading  partners  than  if  it had  started  earlier.”  Most  of  the  growth  of  the 
1960’s occurred  in  manufactures  and  construction.  But  the  stagnation  of  agriculture  helped  to  keep 
Portugal  from  making  the  investments  in  technology  necessary  to  converge  from  such  a low  starting 
point.  Unlike Japan,  Portugal’s  government  designed  no specific policies  to create the technology  transfer 
and spillover.  No policy  existed to generate  convergence  through  encouraging  external  economies  of any 
kind.  In fact the  import  substitution  policy  for agriculture  seemed  to discourage  these types of activities. 
Portugal’s  pattern  of  specializing  in  zero-feedback  goods  has  a long  history.  This  history  is 
characterized  by  Portugal’s  willingness  to  grant  trade  concessions  (to  Great  Britain)  in  exchange  for 
military  protection.  This  pattern  killed  off promising  industrialization  efforts  (again  in textiles)  in  1703 
with the signing  of me  Methuen  Treaty.  This treaty  reopened  Portugal  to English  woolen  cloth and wool 
manufactures  in exchange  for Portugal’s  wines being allowed  into England  at a tariff one-third  lower than 27 
that on French  wines.  The effects of the treaty  were that “[a] few years after  1703, the  import  of English 
woolens  quadrupled,  eliminating  the  entire  domestic  production...”  (Sideri,  1970:45)”  Sideri  goes  on 
to conclude  that,  “the Treaty  caused the destruction  of the only  sector  [textiles] which  could have  served 
as  the  leading  sector  of  the  industrialization  process,  and  whose  very  existence  would  probably  have 
prevented  the  ‘technology  gap’  which  still  affects  Portugal  today.”  (ibid:  47)  Trade  policies  do  have 
long term  effects,  if Portugal  had had a manufacturing  sector  at the beginning  of the  industrial  revolution 
in the  middle  of  the  18th century,  it would  have  been  in  a position  “to assimilate  the  new  production 
techniques  that  were  being  developed.  To  the nonexistence  of  a manufacturing  nucleus  at a stage  when 
production  techniques  were  being  revamped  in the  last quarter  of the  century,  must  be ascribed  the  fact 
that  Portugal  became  an agricultural  dependency  of England.”  (Furtado,  1963:90). 
Other  industrialization  efforts  met  similar  fates.  Around  1770 Portugal  developed  a plan  that 
reestablished  manufacturing,  especially  along  the  coast.  The  effort  ultimately  failed,  partly  because  of 
the invasion  of France  that forced  Portugal  back to pre-1770  trade patterns,  especially  with Great Britain. 
Portugal  was left with an economy  dominated  by a traditional,  slow growth  agricultural  sector  with only 
small pockets  of primitive  manufacturing.  During  the second  half of the  19th century  Portugal  attempted 
again  to  industrialize;  this  time  by building  its infrastructure.  This  effort  failed.  As an example,  from 
1855 to  1859 light  manufacturing  in textiles  and  chemicals  averaged  approximately  7%  of  exports,  but 
by  1890 no industrial  products  were exported  (in percentage  terms)  (Sideri,  1970: 170 and  175).  In sum, 
trade  policies  that  resulted  in Portugal’s  specialization  in zero  feedback  industries  did  play  a significant 
role  in its failure  to converge  to the wealthier  European  countries.  By the late  1960’s and early  1970’s, 
Portugal  did converge  slightly  in terms  of overall  per  capita  income.  However,  this convergence  of per 
capita income  did not result from  a convergence  of vertically  integrated  labor productivity.  In these terms 
Portugal  was  still  diverging  in  1975.  Perhaps  this  is part  of  the  reason  behind  Portugal’s  failure  to 
continue  its slow  convergence  of per  capita  income  since  1975 as is demonstrated  by the  Summers and 28 
Heston  (1988)  data  set.  It  was  not  grounded  in  the  secure  foundation  of  vertically  integrated  labor 
productivity  convergence. 
5.  Conclusion 
This  paper  demonstrates  that while  Portugal  and Japan were  at similar  stages of development  in 
terms  of technology  and per  capita GNP in  1959, by the mid  1970’s Japan had  converged  quickly  to the 
standard  of living  of the U.S.  while Portugal  had not.  Our explanation  of the two countries’  convergence 
experiences  focuses  on  the  role  played  by  increasing  returns,  learning  by  doing,  and  technological- 
spillover  (i.e.,  positive-feedback  goods)  industries.  In increasing  returns  models,  patterns of convergence 
or  divergence  can  become  self-perpetuating  as  initial  conditions  become  locked  in.  If  cumulative 
causation  and  technological  lock-in  are  important  elements  in determining  convergence  or  divergence 
paths,  then  economists  need  to  look  to turning  points  in a country’s  history  to  analyze how  these  paths 
are established.  For  Japan,  we focused  on  the early decisions  by the  Meiji  government  to foster  cotton 
textiles  as an import  competing  industry,  and to build  a high-technology  military  industry.  These  sectors 
proved  to be very  dynamic  in terms  of technology  creation  and dissemination,  and the cultivation  of other 
related  industries  such as machinery,  shipbuilding,  steel,  etc.  For Portugal,  we focused  on the persistent 
failure  to  develop  such  industries.  Historically,  Portugal  gave  up  on  industrialization  efforts  as trade 
concessions  to  Great  Britain,  establishing  a  pattern  of  specialization  in  low-productivity-growth 
agricultural  products.  This  set the stage for the productivity  divergence  witnessed  from  1959 to the mid 
1970’s. 
The  main  point  is not  that  positive-feedback  industries  tell  the  whole  story.  We have  argued, 
however,  that early  historical  patterns  of political  and social action  can have  important  long-term  effects. 
As Hodgson  (1991,  p.  162) puts  it,  ‘I...  events  occuring  during  a crucial  and formative  period  of change 
may  greatly  influence  later  socio-economic  outcomes.”  We  have  argued,  for  example,  that  when 29 
international  trade  acts  to  expand  small  initial  differences  (in productivity,  etc.),  divergence  can be  an 
endogenous  result  of exchange  rather  than  an anomaly  generated  outside  of exchange. 
The  ability  or  inability  of  a nation  to  converge  to  the  productivity  level  of  the  country  on  the 
global  frontier  no  doubt  depends  on  that  nation’s  attainment  of  a  certain  threshold  level  of  income, 
education,  capital  accumulation,  and  equality  of  income  distribution.  We have  emphasized  the  role  of 
institutional  development,  including  an  ability  to  manage  international  trade  and  capture  external 
economies,  and  to  coordinate  investment.  The  determination  of the  required  threshold  and the  factors 
necessary  for  its attainment  are difficult  to capture  in a single  formal  model,  and it is not surprising  that 
no  choice-theoretic  micro  mode1 has  been  developed  to  explain  the  phenomenon.  We  have  proposed 
instead  an  eclectic  approach  which  involves  the  use  of  input-output  data  to  analyze  the  degree  of 
convergence  or  divergence  and historical  analysis  to  capture  the  conjuncture  of socio-economic  factors 
that influence  the process.  “Capital” is considered  heterogeneous  and produced,  thus overcoming  the bias 
inherent  to  analysis  based  on  homogeneous  capital  and  aggregate  production  functions.  Overall  our 
approach  is not a far cry from  the original  approach  by Gershenkron  (1952) to his  “advantages  of relative 
backwardness”  hypothesis,  which  took  the  form  of  a careful  institutional  study  of  the  development  of 









Gomulka  (1987),  for example,  describes  the rationale  for convergence  a “commonsense  notion”. 
Baumol,  Blackman  and Wolff  (1989) and Marris  (1982) are good  examples.  Nelson  (1990) and 
Nelson  and  Wright  (1992)  locate  convergence  in  U.S.  decline,  but  do  not  depict  this  as 
inevitable. 
Presumably  this  is consistent  with  the  view  that the  productivity  growth  slowdown  in advanced 
industrial  countries  over  the  past twenty  years  is due  to the  increasing  share  of services  in total 
output. 
See also  Mueller  (1983),  and Hodgson  (1988). 
Among  the  first  studies  along  these  lines  was the  work  of Gomulka  (1971,  1979).  In the  more 
recent  literature  see,  for example,  Abramowitz  (1983),  Baumol  (1986),  DeLong  (1988),  Baumol 
and Wolff  (1988),  Gomulka  (1990),  Barre  (1991),  and Baumol  (1992). 
Quoted  by  Alam  (1992) from  Cameron  (1982). 
Moreover,  the  ud  hoc  models  have  an  ambiguous  interpretation.  When  all  other  factors  are 
accounted  for,  what is the meaning  of the technology  gap term ?  Specifically,  most of the studies 
of the Gershenkron  hypothesis  use regression  analysis.  First  it is observed  if the base year level 
of productivity  is inversely  correlated  with the growth  rate during  the period  under  consideration. 
If this  relationship  (“gross  convergence”)  is weak,  then  further  analysis  is undertaken  to control 
for  other  factors,  including  educational  attainment,  investment  in  machinery  and  equipment, 
degree  of  openness  to  trade,  etc.  Usually  when  this  is done,  the  “productivity  gap”  variable 
becomes  significant.  That  is, the advantages  of backwardness  are shown once other variables  are 
controlled  for  (so-called  “net convergence”).  But by isolating  all these  other  variables,  they  are 
leaving  the  backwardness  variable  void  of meaning.  In itself the backwardness  variable  is only 







has  no  meaning  in  itself,  except  as  a  proxy  for  technological  disadvantage,  which  itself  is 
meaningless  unless  combined  with  a theory  of technological  diffusion. 
Note that these  explanations  are different  from  models  of  “uneven  development.”  The  latter are 
aimed  at  explaining  divergence  and  thus,  like  the  common  forces  and  contagion  models, 
emphasize  only one possible  outcome.  Some prominent  models  of divergence  include  Dixon and 
Thirlwall  (1975),  Krugman  (198 1) and  Mainwaring  (1991).  Also  see  Milberg  and  Elmslie 
(1993). 
For a more  complete  analysis of Smith’s  theory  of trade  and development  see Elrnslie and James 
(1993). 
See,  for  example,  Baumol  (1986,  1992),  Baumol,  Blackman  and  Wolff  (1989),  Wolff  (1991), 
Dollar  and Wolff  (1988,  1992) and  Dowrick  and  Nguyen  (1989). 
Note  that the  resurgence  in popularity  of the  aggregate  production  function  is not limited  to the 
convergence  literature.  The  “new”  growth  theory  and the  New  Classical  macroeconomics  are 
also based  on  this discredited  concept.  (See Romer,  1986, Plosser,  1989) 
Of course  the rejection  of the Solow residual  is equivalent  to a rejection  of the neoclassical  notion 
of  a shift  versus  a movement  along  a given  production  function.  Kaldor  (1961)  rejected  the 
feasibility  of this distinction  and  thus  turned  to a technical  progress  function  as an alternative. 
The  percentage  rate of change  in A equals  the following:  if/A  =  [ (1  -S)  g/w+  (S)  r”lrl  , 
where  s,  r,  and  w are the  constant  share  of  income  going  to  capital,  the  rate of profit,  and the 
wage  rate.  In  a  disaggregated,  homogeneous  input,  homogeneous  output  model,  with  Hicks 
neutral  technical  progress,  if/A is  immune  to  changes  in  w  and  r  (i.e.,  a movement  along  a 
linear  wage-profit  frontier).  However,  absent  these  strict  assumptions,  or  those  adopted  in 





composition  of output,  and changes  in the valuation  of  capital.  All of these  are  independent  of 
changes  in technology. 
Baumol,  Blackman  and Wolff  (1989) do calculate  input-output  based measures  of labor and total 
productivity,  but these  are done  only  for the  case of the  U.S.  in  1947 and  1976, and  in order  to 
confirm  the  NIPA-based  observed  stagnancy  of labor  productivity  in service  sectors  in the  U. S , 
resulting  from  “cost disease”. 
Momigliano  and  Siniscalco  (1984) argue  that the  direct  approach  will  be  misleading  if indirect 
effects  are significant.  Also  see  Milberg  and Elmslie  (1992). 
See Pasinetti  (1973). 
See  United  Nations  (1976).  This  is the  most  up-to-date  internationally  compatible  input-output 
data  set.  Maddison  (1982,  1991) and  Summers  and  Heston  (1988),  the  usual  data  sources  for 
convergence  tests,  provide  only  aggregate  data  and  are used  below  for  the  purpose  of  general 
18. 
19. 
comparison  with  our  disaggregated  results. 
The  coefficient  of variation  is the  standard  deviation  divided  by the  mean. 
More  recently,  Dollar  and Wolff  (1992) report  a major  slowdown  in the  rate of convergence  in 
20. 
21. 
nine  countries  after  1972.  This  is consistent  with  the results  reported  here. 
The  exception  is that Italy  appears  as the low productivity  country  in sector  three  in  1970.  This 
is obviously  a data  error.  Italy  was the high  productivity  country  in sector  three  for  1959 and 
1965.  Moreover,  the  ratio jumps  from  4.05  in  1965 to  13.75 in 1970 and back down  to 2.30  in 
1975. 
As  Table  VIII  reports,  primary  products  exports  did  rise  until  WWII.  This  export  expansion 
clearly  represents  a rapid  rise in agricultural  productivity  that characterised  the Meiji period.  As 
we  will  show  was the  case  in manufacturing,  this  increase  in agricultural  productivity  resulted 









between  farmers  as to  the  best  practice  techniques,  and  the  transferring  of  foreign  techniques. 
The  latter  effort  began  by bringing  in foreign  experts  from  the  United  States and  Great  Britain. 
However,  the large scale techniques  encouraged  by these consultants  proved  unsuitable  to Japan’s 
small  plot  farms.  The  Japanese  then  sought  the  expertise  of  German  and  Dutch  scientists  and 
engineers.  They  encouraged  improvements  in technique  and seed,  as well  as the  increased  use 
of fertilizers.  These  changes  were  a major  source  of  improved  agricultural  productivity  during 
the Meiji period.  The  increase  in agricultural  productivity  was sought  by the government  largely 
as part  of  its overall  industrialization  effort.  (Maddison,  1965) 
In the early period  exports  were dominated  by silk textiles,  later cotton textiles  became  a primary 
export. 
These  figures  were  developed  from  Yamazawa  and Yamamoto  (1979). 
The  members  also  agreed  not to hire  skilled  workers  away from  each  other.  When  this  pledge 
failed,  the  association  acted to  mediate  (Crawcour,  1988). 
The  dyestuffs  industry  was  also  an  important  downstream  industry  developed  directly  from 
textiles  (Yamazawa,  1990). 
Oshima  (1965)  is one  example. 
For  example,  cotton  textiles  exports  exceeded  imports  for  the  first  time  in  1897.  This  export 
success  was aided  greatly  by the victory  in the Sino-Japanese  War which  resulted  in the opening 
of the  cotton  trade  to  China. 
Cotton  textiles  was  an  early  benefactor.  The  Osaka  plant  used  gears  supplied  by  an  arsenal, 
while  most  other  early  plants  used  steam  engines  produced  by an arsenal  (Yamamura,  1977). 
The  Yawata Iron Works  was created  in 1895 because of the increased  demand  for iron associated 
with  the  war.  With  great  technical  assistance,  production  began  in  1901 and  was Japan’s  first 







These  shipyards  also produced  locomotives,  turbines,  railroad  cars and other  machinery  for the 
private  sector  (Yamamura,  1977). 
In fact  Portugal’s  per  capita  GDP  grew  faster  than  Norway’s  from  1965 to  1970. 
The  major  exceptions  were  tropical  medicine  and civil  engineering. 
This  is confirmed  by  the vertically  integrated  analysis  above.  Portugal  is second  only  to Japan 
in  1959  and  1965  as  the  lowest  productivity  country  in  agriculture,  and  it  is  the  lowest 
productivity  country  in  1970 and  1975. 
In  1950,  48 % of  employment  was  in  agriculture,  while  agriculture  accounted  for  28%  of  the 
GNP  and  70%  of  exports.  By  1970,  agriculture  accounted  only  for  32%  of  employment  and 
17% of GNP,  while  manufactured  goods  accounted  for  60%  of exports.  (Murteira,  1979) 
The  treaty  brought  a formal  end to Portugal’s  first major  attempt  an industrialization  policy.  In 
the  late  17th  century,  D’Ericeira  (superintendent  of  manufactures  Portugal)  developed  an 
industrialization  plan centering  on glass and textiles.  This effort  included  “hiring foreign  experts 
and  artisans  from  France,  England,  Spain,  and Venice;  lending  funds;  and granting  all sorts  of 
privileges  to the  new  industries.”  (Marques,  1976:382) 35 
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Table  I 
Final  Aggregated  Industrial  Sectors 
Sector  Industry  Group  Corresponding 
Orisinal  Sectors  in  the  Input-Output  Data  Base 




Agriculture,  hunting,  fishing 
and  forestry 
Coal  mining,  crude  petroleum, 
and  natural  gas 
Metal  ore  and  other  mining 
4  Food,  beverages  and  tobacco 










Wood,  wood  products,  paper 
and  printing 
Chemicals  and  rubber 
Petroleum  and  coal  products 
Non-metallic  mineral  products 
Ferrous  and  non-ferrous  metals 
(Basic  Metals) 
Machinery,  transport  and  other 
manufactured  goods 
Electricity,  gas  and  water 
Construction 
Trade,  distribution,  transportation, 





5,  6 
7 




13,  14 
15  16,  17 
16  18 
17,  ia  19,  21,  22 
1 
2,  3 
4,  5 
6 
7 









1  3.76 
2  10.93 
3  6.96 
4  2.41 
5  5.92 
6  4.38 
7  4.20 
8  4.12 
9  4.02 
10  6.29 
11  5.19 
12  8.95 
13  6.74 
14  4.52 




1  2.97 
2  5.97 
3  13.75 
4  3.60 
5  3.28 
6  2.37 
7  2.41 
8  3.44 
9  2.44 
10  2.87 
11  2.28 
12  1.86 
13  3.65 
14  2.69 
MEDIAN  2.92 
Table  II 
Total  Productivity  Ratios  1959-1975* 
Countries 


























































































*The  countries  included  in  this  table  are  Germany,  Italy,  Japan, 
Norway,  and  Portugal.  To  properly  interpret  this  table,  remember 
that  a  high  vertically  integrated  labor  coefficient  implies  low 
total  productivity.  Thus  the  country  in the  numerator  (e.g.,  Japan 
in  sector  1  in  1959  and  1965)  is  the  low-productivity  country, 
while  the  country  in the  denominator  (e.g.,  Germany  in sector  1 for 
all  years)  is  the  high-productivity  country. 
(Source:  Elmslie  and  Milberg,  1992) Table  III 
















coefficients  of  Variation  of 
Vertically  Integrated  Labor  Coefficients* 
.  4599 
.8438 
.  8454 
3069 
:6414 
.  4730 
.  5854 
.5946 
.  5465 
.  7297 
..6746 
1.1706 
.  7536 
.  5722 
.  6180 
.  5035 
7266 
:5754 
.  2960 
.  4640 
.  4511 
.  3887 
.  7187 
4003 
:4382 
.  6014 
1.2936 
.  6223 
.  5060 
.  5047 
.4413 
.  6061 
9839 
:5408 
.  4267 
.  3943 
2960 
:5156 
.  4011 
.  3742 
.  3460 
.  2754 
.  6222 
.  3739 
.  4139 
.  6567 
.  9444 
.  3826 
7370 
:7390 
.  7250 
.  4866 
.7259 
.  6207 
.  2423 
.  2965 
.  5936 
.  6069 
.  5290 
.  6138 
*The  countries  included  in  this  table  are  Germany,  Italy,  Japan, 
Norway,  and  Portugal. 
(Source:  Elmslie  and  Milberg,  1992) 46 
Table  IV 
Gross  Domestic  Product  Per  Capita 
(Thousands  of  1975  $US) 
Countrv  1959  1965  1970 
Germany  4876  6209  7443 
Italy  2969  3952  5028 
Japan  2003  3391  5496 
Norway  4866  6205  7104 
Portugal  1360  1850  2575 








(Source:  Summers  and  Heston,  1988) Table  V 
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1  3.76 
2  10.93 
3  2.36 
4  2.41 
5  5.92 
6  4.38 
7  4.20 
a  4.12 
9  2.13 
10  6.29 
11  5.19 
12  a.95 
13  2.54 
14  4.52 




1  2.24 
2  3.61 
3  13.75 
4  2.41 
5  3.28 
6  2.37 
7  1.98 
a  3.44 
9  1.56 
10  1.86 
11  2.28 
12  1.19 
13  1.55 
14  2.32 
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*The  countries  included  in  this  table  are  Germany,  Italy,  Japan, 
and  Norway. 
(Source:  Milberg  and  Elmslie,  1993) 48 
Table  VI 
















Coefficients  of  Variation  of 
Vertically  Integrated  Labor  Coefficients* 
Excluding  Portugal 
.  5267 
.  9193 
.  3311 
.  3256 




.  3393 
.7022 
.  6540 
1.2319 
.  3434 
.  6337 
.  6375 
.  5586 
.  a374 
.  2501 
.  3258 




.  3808 
.  4754 
.  5448 
1.3279 
.  3533 
.  5638 
.  5291 
1970 
.  3577 
4424 
1:1092 
.  3924 
.  4655 
.  4183 
.  2707 
.  6028 
.  2045 
.  2547 
.  3316 
.  0783 
.  2146 
.  3434 
.  3506 
1975 
.  2936 
.  8063 
.  2160 
.  3230 
.  5013 
.  3836 
.  2699 
7704 
:2624 
.  2596 
.  3454 
.  0944 
.  1949 
.  2465 
.  2818 
*The  countries  included  in  this  table  are  Germany,  Italy,  Japan, 
Norway. 
(Source:  Milberg  and  Elmslie,  1993) 49 
Year  USA  Japan 
1870  .  70 
1880  .  88 
1890  1.06 
1900  1.29 
1913  1.67 
1929  2.45 
1938  2.62 
1950  4.25 
1960  5.41 
1970  6.96 
1973  7.60 
1978  8.19 
1979  8.28 
Table  VII 
GDP/Man-Er  in  1970  US$ 
USA-JaDan 
USA 
.  17 
.20* 
.  24* 
.  32* 
.  37 
t64 
.87 
.  9975 
.  7727 
.  7.735 
.7519 
.7784 
.  7387 
.6679 
.  59  .  8612 
1.03  .  8096 
2.79  .  5991 
3.49  .  5408 
4.22  .  4847 
4.39  .  4698 
constant  *Interpolated  using 
(n.a.) 
(Source:  Maddison,  1982) 
geometric  growth,  1870-1913  data 
Norway  Norway-Japan 
.  40 
.  46 
.  56 
.  63 










.  575 
.  565 
.  571 
.  492 
.  549 
.  500 
.  463 
.  709 
.  661 
.  416 
.  339 
.  344 

























9.3 0 3.2 .1 1.5
14.5 0 8.4 .6 2.5
24.3 .2 10.2 .8 6.6
27.5 .2 13.8 1.5 12.5
81.9 .7 19.6 2.6 10.2
97.1 23.4 25.7 4.2 13.0
164.3 9.4 40.2 9.6 14.3
290.7 17.1 56.4 11.5 29.5
420.1 18.7 95.1 19.1 56.8
475.3 20.7 87.4 23.9 56.0
768.8 16.2 99.9 35.1 49.8
871.3 15.8 171.5 53.2 106.1
1665.1 42.8 311.2 103.8 256.2
1353.5 106.2 395.9 113.8 232.6
135.4 4.8 16.8 20.4 72.9
257.7 15.5 31.5 32.5 116.8
428.8 21.4 89.8 56.1 192.9
519.0 35.7 309.8 95.4 618.4
768.9 37.2 872.3 129.8 1160.0
Table VIII
Japan Commodity Exports by Industry
at Constant Prices 1874-1939,  1951-1970*
Mach&- Misc.




















.3 16.3 20.5 38.5
1.7 29.9 29.6 61.4
2.5 47.8 37.1 88.8
4.0 61.8 49.9 115.7
10.3 130.5 71.2 209.1
17.2 169.8 77.6 262.5
29.3 306.2 74.1 400.6
43.6 489.1 104.6 628.3
100.3 774.9 143.4 968.3
82.4 833.2 91.6 995.6
82.0 1157.8 145.8 1435.9
106.2 1516.4 136.8 1755.3
216.7 3055.7 210.5 3411.1
252.9 3147.4 278.6 3480.0
17.5 311.0 16.4 332.3
40.8 615.8 37.5 668.5
126.3 1304.0 75.8 1405.9
224.7 2927.5 93.4 3057.7
284.2 6386.7 85.8 6547.8
Total Primary Total
Manuf. Products Exports
Source: s-Term Economic Statistics of Japan Since 1868 eds. Kazushi Ohkawa, Mizohei Estimates of Lon
Shinohara, and Malaji Umemura, Volume 14,
Yuzo Yamamoto,
Foreisn Trade and Balance of Payments, Ippei  Yamazawa  and
Toyo Keizai Shinposha: Tokyo, 1979.
of this 14 volume data set.
Crawcour (1988) cites Japanese language critiques
*3874-1939  are given in 1935-1936 prices in million of yen;
l,i I  1 i  ens  ot  yell.
1951-1970 are  given  in 1965 prices in51 
Table  IX 
Changes  in  the  Importance  of  Manufactures  in  Japanese  Exports 
Year 
Total  Textiles/total  Manuf.  Exports*/ 




















.  423 
487 
:538 
.  534 
.  624 
.  647 
764 
:778 
.  800 
.837 
.  806 
.  864 
,896 
.  904 
.  936 
.  921 
.  928 
.  957 
.  975 
.  571 





.  537 






.  430 
.  435 
.  418 
.  329 
.  177 
.  120 
.  046 
062 
:oso 
.  072 
.  093 
.  109 
.  166 
.  141 
.  037 
.  063 
.  084 
.  116 
*GNP  data  is  taken  from  Japanese  Economic  Growth:  Trend 
Acceleration  in  the  Twentieth  Century  by  Kazushi  Ohkawa  and  Henry 
Rosovsky,  Stanford  University  Press:  Stanford,  1973.  To  1939,  GNP 
is given  at  1934-36  prices  in million  yen,  from  1951,  GNP  is  given 
at  1960  prices  in  billion  yen. 52 
Appendix  A:  Data  Sources  and  Manipulation 
a.  Input-Output  Tables 
The  A matrices  of each  country  were  constructed  from  the Standardized Input-Output Tables of 
ECE  hm-iesfor  Years around  1959,  1965,  1970,  and  1975 published  through  the  United  Nations  by 
the  Economic  Commission  for  Europe.  Each  transaction  matrix  for  years  around  1970 and  1975 is 
aggregated  to 24 sectors by the ECE utilizing the post-1965  International  Standard Industrial  Classification 
(ISIC).  Most  sectors  are aggregated  to the  2digit  level.  Each  matrix  for  years  around  1959 and  1965 
is aggregated  to 20 sectors  by the  ECE  using  the pre-1965  ISIC. 
In  order  to  make  the  tables  compatible  with  each  other  and  the  available  labor  data,  certain 
manipulations  of the data were performed.  First,  the tables were made  compatible.  Italy had one sector 
that  was  not  reported  in  1970  and  1975;  this  sector  had  to  be  filled  in  order  for  the  results  to  be 
comparable  between  countries.  The  missing  sector  is other  mining  (ISIC  29).  The  methodology  to 
develop  the  Italy  sector  was to take  the  data  from  France  and  assume  xti/li,  =  x+/l,  where  i and j  are 
standard  input-output  sectors,  and  y and  z are  each  country.  The  xij for  Italy  was  then  divided  by  its 
purchasing  power  parity  exchange  rate  (z/y) to make  it conform  with the rest of the table.  The  sectoral 
output  data are derived  by  assuming  that x,/l,  =  x,/l,.  Again,  this is divided  by the purchasing  power 
parity  exchange  rate. 
The vertically  integrated  labor coefficients  were made compatible  between  countries  by converting 
the country-currency-denominated  output  to a dollar-denominated  output,  multiplying  by the United States 
purchasing  power  parity  exchange  rate from  Ward (1985).  Also,  the output  was deflated  by dividing  by 
a wholesale  price  index  (1970  =  100) for  general  goods  published  in the  Statistical  Yearbook  (19771. 
Second,  in order  to make  the tables consistent  with the  labor data,  we aggregated  the 24 semrs 
for  1970 and  1975 and the  20 sectors  for  1959 and  1965 into  14 sectors  shown  in Table  I. 53 
b.  Labor  Data 
The  labor  data  used  to  develop  the  direct  labor  coefficients  are  taken  from  the  Yearbook  of 
Zndusfriul  Sfafistics,  Vol.  2,  2976  edition  published  by  the  United  Nations,  and  from  Labour  Force 
Smistics,  OECD,  1986.  To obtain the missing  sector  for Italy the following  methodology  was employed: 
1,/x,  =  1,/X,  for  countries  y and z. 54 
Appendix  B:  A Model  of Convergence  and Divergence 
Consider  a  simple  Ricardian  m  country,  one  factor  world  producing  n  goods  with 
constant  returns  to  scale  at any time  t.  Following  Krugman  (1987),  actual  labor productivity  at 
any  point  in  time  is  a  function  of  cumulative  output.  Goods  are  defined  by  the  effect  of 
experience  on productivity  and the  effect  of output  on experience.  Let X, indicate  the output  of 
any good  i from  country  j.  For  reasons  that become  clear later,  these goods  are called positive- 
feedback  goods.  Also,  let  xij represent  the  output  of  any  zero-feedback  good  i  produced  by 
country  j.  Given  a Ricardian  formulation  of the  model,  we obtain  the  following: 
(1) 
where  L,  and 1; are the  labor  USHI  to  produce  X, and xij respectively,  and A,  =  X,/L,  and 
aij  =  x,/l;j. 
Over  time,  as experience  accumulates,  productivity  increases  due  to learning.  Thus: 
A&t)  =  Kp=J  We,*1 
(2) 
au(z) = k&t>“l  OIA,‘l 
where  &j  and  k;j represent  accumulated  knowledge  in the  production  of  any  X; and  Xi  for  each 
country  j.  One distinguishing  characteristic  between  positive  and zero-feedback  goods  is that Ej 
>  xj for  all j’s.  In  practice,  goods  have  more  or  less  positive  feedback  characteristics.  For 
simplicity  assume  that 4  =  0 and  S  >  0.  The  relationship  between  productivity  and output  for 
positive  and zero-feedback  goods  is shown  in figure  1.’ 
’  Note  that in the  general  case  aij is below  A,  for  any constant  level  of I$  =  kj. 55 
Figure  1 
aij 
Knowledge  is accumulated  by increased  output.  However,  knowledge  in any given good 
Xi and  q  is  augmented  not  only  by 
increased  output  of  other  industries 
industry,  etc.).  Thus: 
increases  in  a  commodity’s  own  output,  but  also  by  the 
(i.e.,  producers  of  jet  aircraft  learn  from  the  aerospace 
q&f)  =  /orx&z)  +  bx&dz  O$hl 
(3) 
kii<f)  =  j:aX&z)  +  ~xo~z)dz  *a4  tip4 
where  t is time,  z is the  integration  factor  over  time  and 6,  OL,  and /3 are parameters  specifying 
the  rates  of knowledge  spillover. 
Knowledge  is transmitted  perfectly  between  positive-feedback  goods,  but these goods  can 
gain  knowledge  from  zero-feedback  goods  as well.  The  closer  6 is to zero,  the less of this type 
of  knowledge  accumulation  that  takes  place.  Zero-feedback  goods  producers  also  accumulate 
knowledge,  but this  occurs  at a slower  rate which  is determined  by 01  and 8. 
Thus,  two  characteristics  distinguish  positive  from  zero-feedback  goods.  First,  from 
equation  2,  learning  has  a stronger  effect  on  the  labor  productivity  in positive-feedback  goods 56 
production.  Second,  from  equation  3,  knowledge  is accumulated  faster  for  any given  increase 
in output  for  positive-feedback  goods.Z 
Now,  assuming  full  employment,  fixed  labor  forces  in each  country  j,  and  no savings, 
we  may  open  the  model  to  international  trade.  Countries  will specialize  production  in either  a 
positive-feedback  or  a zero-feedback  good.  The  determinant  of  any  country’s  specialization 
pattern  may  be  any  number  of  factors.’  For  example,  country  1 may  have  a  technological 
advantage  in the production  of any positive-feedback  good,  thus  it has a high  E.  Country  2 may 
be larger,  thus  possessing  a great  deal of experience,  or  its laborers  may  have a strong  tastes for 
a particular  good,  also  resulting  in a larger  accumulation  of  knowledge.  Whatever  the  reason, 
some  countries  specialize  in a positive-feedback  good  while others  specialize  in a zero  feedback 
good. 
Continuing  with the special  case example  where  h  =  0, we denote  countries  specializing 
in positive-feedback  goods  as D and  countries  specializing  in zero-feedback  goods  as U.  Also 
assume  in  this  case  that  specialization  is based  on  a technology  gap  between  D  and  U  in the 
production  of positive-feedback  goods.  Thus,  for any given &,  A,  >  Ai”.  The opening  to trade 
forces  U out of positive-feedback  production.  As shown  in figure  2, this  causes  A,  to stagnate 
at Ai”,  while  A,  increases  with  increased  knowledge. 
Tar  the  special  case described  in Figure  1, knowledge  plays  no role  in increasing  labor 
productivity. 
’  Given  that this  is not  a model  interested  in establishing  one  major  factor  determining  trade 
patterns,  we are not particularly  concerned  with  what determines  trade  patterns  in any specific  case. 57 
Figure  2 
Relative  productivities  continually  diverge  (i.e.,  trade  causes  a  divergence  of  relative 
A 
SD 
JGD  productivities  so that  2  = -  continually  increases.  In the  special  case,  the zero-feedback 
A  iu  K,$ 
goods  play  no direct  role  in the  measure  of divergence. 
The  result  of  international  trade  is not  one  “convergence  club”  but  two.  D  countries 
converge  to  each  other,  at ever  increasing  productivity  levels,  while  U countries  converge  at a 
stagnant  level.  A  further  important  result  of  the  continued  divergence  between  the  D  and  U 
countries  is  that  once  a  pattern  of  specialization  is  established  it  is  ever  more  difficult  to 
overcome.  This  is the  lock-in  result  often  referred  to  in the  positive  feedback  literature. 